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THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S "NEW ASYLUM
SEEKERS": RESPONSES TO AN EXPANDED
IMMIGRATION DOCKET
John R.B. Palmer'
INTRODUCTION
The year 2002 saw a dramatic shift in the dynamics of immigration
litigation in the United States. Triggered by a "streamlining" of the
Department of Justice (DOJ)'s administrative review of expulsion
orders,' immigration appeals have been pouring into the federal courts in
record numbers. Not only is DOJ ordering more people expelled, but a
significantly higher proportion of these people are now seeking judicial
2
review. For the first time ever, the courts of appeals have become major
focal points for immigration litigation-not just in exceptionally
compelling or strategic cases, but in ordinary, run-of-the-mill cases as
well. Judicial review has become a regular component of the expulsion
3process.
The consequences of this new phenomenon are multiple, and will
likely reverberate throughout the entire system of immigration law.
Among other things, DOJ's streamlined review has meant that the courts
of appeals are increasingly reviewing oral immigration judge (IJ)
opinions directly, without the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) first
smoothing over rough edges. This has brought the federal courts face to
face with a system of administrative adjudication straining under a
At the time of writing, the author was an associate supervisory staff attorney for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The author is grateful to Professor Gerald L.
Neuman for his valuable comments on an earlier draft, and to the editors of the Catholic
University Law Review for all their work in organizing the symposium and improving this
article. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views or policies of the Second Circuit or any other person or entity.
1. "Expulsion" is a generic term used here to refer to removal, deportation, and
exclusion.
2. See John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration Surge in the
Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2006); John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are So Many
People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An
Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 3-4
(2005).
3. See Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 8.
4. See id. at 28.
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massive caseload that often seems to dwarf the resources allocated to it.5
Moreover, huge numbers of immigration cases have added to the federal
courts' already-crowded dockets, and there is no sign of the flow
subsiding.6 Nowhere has this result been more pronounced than in the
Second and Ninth Circuits.
7
This article focuses on the situation in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. The immigration appeals coming into that court (and
this is probably true in the other courts of appeals as well) are largely
8
related to asylum applications. In other words, most of the appeals are
being brought by people who claim to be refugees and who seek to avoid
being expelled on that basis. High-volume asylum applications have
been a significant feature of the systems of immigration adjudication in
North America and Western Europe since the 1980s. 9 Whereas asylum-
seekers previously tended to concentrate in the countries directly
bordering those from which they fled, moving farther afield only as part
of organized refugee resettlement programs, the 1980s marked the
beginning of a new pattern of "intercontinental jet-age asylum-seekers"
arriving spontaneously "by sea and by air in increasingly large numbers
in countries far away from their homelands."' 0 At least in the United
States, however, these "new asylum seekers"'1 mostly limited their
litigation to the agency level, and ventured into the judicial branch only
in exceptional cases.'2 The increase in appeals that began in 2002,
therefore, marks the federal courts' first real encounter with this type of
high-volume asylum adjudication.
The Second Circuit has responded with a number of procedural
measures aimed at improving its ability to keep up with the added
5. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Techniques for Managing High-Volume
Asylum Systems, 81 IOWA L. REV. 671, 701-02 (1996).
6. See Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 3, 43-49.
7. See Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls: In Which the Author Explains How
Restrictions on Judicial Review and the Administrative Process Increase Immigration Cases
in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006); Palmer, Yale-Loehr &
Cronin, supra note 2, at 44-45.
8. Benson, supra note 7; see also Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 71-
72.
9. See Matthew J. Gibney, The State of Asylum: Democratisation, Judicialisation and
Evolution of Refugee Policy, in THE REFUGEES CONVENTION 50 YEARS ON:
GLOBALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 19, 22-23 (Susan Kneebone ed., 2003);
David A. Martin, The New Asylum Seekers, in THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE
LAW IN THE 1980s 1, 4-5 (David A. Martin ed., 1988).
10. Martin, supra note 9, at 1 (quoting Report of the Executive Comm. of the High
Commissioner's Programme (35h Sess.) '1 76, U.N. DOC. A/AC.96/651 (1984)).
11. See generally id.
12. See David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast
of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1325 (1990).
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caseload. These have included an initial effort to resolve large numbers
of cases through compulsory mediation, a tightening of the time in which
records and briefs are filed, the implementation of a process through
which asylum appeals may be adjudicated without oral argument, and the
creation of a specialized "immigration unit" within the court's central
Staff Attorneys Office.13 As a result, the court is now adjudicating
immigration appeals at a higher rate than it is receiving them, and it has
made significant progress toward reducing its existing backlog. In
addition, the court is publishing a large number of precedential opinions
in immigration cases, resolving a wide range of issues and adding to the
development of the law.
One of the most striking aspects about this new caselaw is the degree
to which it is focused on questions of evidence and credibility. Whereas
the comparative trickle of immigration appeals before 2002 appear to
have been largely self-selected to pose discrete questions of law, the
recent shift in litigation tactics has flooded the court with cases that turn
on adverse credibility determinations. Such fact-specific cases might
seem well-suited for disposition through nonprecedential orders, yet the
court has chosen to set precedent in a relatively large number of them.
Between the start of 2002 and July 14, 2006 (the time of writing), the
court had already issued forty-one precedential opinions on adverse
credibility determinations, addressing the bases on which such
determinations may or may not rest, the level of deference they are
accorded, and the proper remedy when they turn out to be flawed. 4
The immersion in credibility issues is probably the result of the court's
confrontation with the paradigm of the new asylum seeker, whose
intercontinental travel often complicates the fact-finding process and
generates skepticism among receiving countries' authorities. 5  This
skepticism can become especially pronounced when large numbers of
asylum claims are fed through the standardizing machinery of the high-
volume law office or "travel agency" and rapidly spit out in cookie-cutter
form.'6 While the skepticism may be warranted in many cases, it places
genuine refugees in an extremely precarious situation, and it often leads
to a tension between first-instance administrative adjudicators and
reviewing courts-a tension that appears to be reflected in many of the
Second Circuit's recent opinions.
Part I of this article provides an overview of the Second Circuit's
caseload and explains why the increase in immigration appeals has been
13. See infra Part II.A-D.
14. See infra note 74 and accompanying text; text accompanying notes 123-47.
15. See infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
16. See Palmer, supra note 2.
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so significant for the court. Part II discusses the court's procedural
responses to this increase, and the degree to which they have enabled it
to keep up with the increased work. Part III then examines the court's
focus on evidence and credibility and proposes the new asylum seeker
paradigm as one possible explanation. The article presents a parallel
between the current tension over credibility findings and a very similar
situation that transpired some 100 years ago, during the country's first
experiment with restrictive immigration policies. Although the Article
does not attempt to quantify the extent to which today's administrative
decisions are flawed, it explains how the flaws that do exist seem to stem
from a tendency of many administrative adjudicators to be swayed by
generalized skepticism about the "new asylum seekers" and to view their
claims in the aggregate instead of tying findings to the evidence
presented in each individual case. Now that the increased litigation has
immersed the court in credibility issues, this administrative tendency is
butting up against the judiciary's case-by-case, record-oriented approach
to individualized justice.
I. CASELOAD
A. Quantity
The recent increase in the federal courts' immigration appeals is a
phenomenon that has received significant attention from journalists,
scholars, and legal practitioners." Beginning in April 2002, the number
of challenges to BIA decisions lodged in the U.S. courts of appeals began
to rise dramatically, climbing from an average of about 150 petitions for
review per month to an average of about 770 per month. 8 The bulk of
17. See, e.g., ABA COMM'N ON IMMIGR. POLICY, PRACTICE & PRO BONO, SEEKING
MEANINGFUL REVIEW: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN RESPONSE TO DORSEY
& WHITNEY STUDY OF BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PROCEDURAL REFORMS 1-4
(2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/immigration/bia.pdf [hereinafter ABA
REPORT]; COMM. ON FED. COURTS, ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., THE
SURGE OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT
OF APPEALS 1-2 (2004), available at http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/AppealSurge
Report.pdf [hereinafter ABCNY REPORT]; DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, STUDY
CONDUCTED FOR: THE ABA COMM'N ON IMMIGR. POLICY, PRACTICE & PRO BONO,
RE: BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE
MANAGEMENT 39-41 (2003), available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/
DorseyStudyABA_8mgPDF.pdf; STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
LAW AND POLICY 729-31 (4th ed. 2005); Benson, supra note 7; Palmer, supra note 2;
Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 3-8. For media accounts of this increase,
see Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 8 n.17.
18. See Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 44. The direct causes of this
phenomenon are a rise in both (1) the volume of BIA decisions being issued each month,
and (2) the rate at which those decisions are appealed. See id. at 4. The causes of the
increase in appeal rate are more difficult to pin down, but have been hypothesized as (1)
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these challenges have been lodged in the Second and Ninth Circuits. 9 In
the Second Circuit alone, there has been an average of 171 petitions for
review per month since April 2002-more than the average number of
petitions filed each month nationwide before 2002.20 In total, the Second
Circuit received 7,723 petitions for review between April 1, 2002 and
21October 1, 2005.
These numbers may look impossibly large to anyone contemplating
the amount of work required for adjudication, but their actual impact
obviously depends on such things as staffing and resources, as well as
simply the volume and mix of cases to which courts have become
accustomed. In the Second Circuit, the post-2002 petitions for review
have been significant because they so greatly outnumber the pre-2002
filings, and because they make up such a large percentage of the court's
overall docket.22 Moreover, this major increase in caseload has not been
accompanied by any increase in the number of judgeships, which has
remained at thirteen since 1984.3
Since 2002, the Second Circuit has been receiving significantly more
immigration appeals every month than it used to receive in an entire
24year. In total, it has now received more than three times as many
immigration appeals since 2002 as it received in the previous thirty years
combined.25 This has had a significant effect on the court's overall
docket, which increased by 56% between fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year
2005.26 Petitions for review drove most of this increase, which would
an increase in the proportion of BIA decisions constituting final expulsion orders, (2) an
increase in the proportion of final orders of removal involving non-detained aliens, and (3)
a shift in litigation behavior among immigration lawyers and their clients based on the
high volume of BIA decisions and dissatisfaction with the BIA's procedures. See id. at 6-7.
19. See id. at 44-45.
20. See id.
21. See Palmer, supra note 2.
22. See Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 44-45, 48-49.
23. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, § 201, 98 Stat. 333, 346-47 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2000)) (providing for the most
recent increase in Second Circuit judgeships, from eleven to thirteen); see also
Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships in U.S. Courts of Appeals,
http://www.uscourts.gov/history/chronological-appeals.pdf (last visited June 27, 2006). In
addition to the thirteen active judges on the Second Circuit, the court also has a
fluctuating number of judges on senior status. See 28 U.S.C. § 371(b)(1) (2000). That
number currently stands at ten. See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, List of
Second Circuit Judges, http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/JudgesMain.htm (last visited June 27,
2006).
24. See Palmer, supra note 2.
25. See id. (reporting 2,360 petitions for review filed between April 1, 1972 and April
1, 2002, and 7,723 petitions filed between April 1, 2002 and October 1, 2005).
26. See Federal Court Management Statistics 2005, Courts of Appeals,
http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsa2005.pl (last visited Aug. 16, 2006) [hereinafter
2006]
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have been only 3% had the number of petitions for review remained
steady. 7 In terms of the composition of the docket, petitions for review
accounted for around 4% of all of the court's filings before 2002.28 They
now make up about 36%, which makes them the court's largest single
category of cases. 29 The Second Circuit now receives more petitions for
review than civil appeals between private parties.30 In fact, it receives
more petitions for review than private civil appeals and criminal appeals
combined.31
B. Quality
Petitions for review, by definition, challenge administrative expulsion
32
orders. In other words, all of these cases coming into the courts of
appeals are being brought by people whom DOJ has ordered expelled
from the United States. The petitions are usually the first opportunities
these people have for judicial review of their expulsion orders.33
Although the Second Circuit does not systematically track the precise
issues raised in these petitions, it is clear that the majority of them hinge
on asylum claims. These are people who generally conceded that they
Federal Court Management Statistics] (reporting 7,035 cases filed in the Second Circuit
during fiscal year 2005, as compared to 4,519 during fiscal year 2001).
27. This figure is calculated using the number of petitions for review filed in the
Second Circuit during fiscal years 2005 (2,550) and 2001 (173) reported in the data sets
assembled by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO) and the Federal Judicial
Center (FJC) and disseminated by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research (ICPSR). See Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 33-34; see also
Federal Court Management Statistics, supra note 26 (noting the numbers for overall
Second Circuit filings during those fiscal years-7,035 for 2005 and 4,519 for 2001).
28. See Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 48.
29. The percentage is calculated from the number of petitions for review filed in the
Second Circuit in fiscal year 2005 (2,550)-obtained from the ICPSR data sets-and the
total number of Second Circuit filings in 2005 (7,035)-obtained from the AO's 2005
Federal Court Management Statistics. See supra note 27. That this is the largest single
category of cases can be seen by comparing it with the categories listed in Judicial Business
of the U.S. Courts 2005, excluding, of course, the "administrative appeals" category into
which petitions for review themselves fall. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2005, at 134 tbl.B-6 (2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/contents.html [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF
THE U.S. COURTS 2005].
30. In fiscal year 2005, the court received 1,511 civil appeals between private parties,
see JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2005, supra note 29, at 134 tbl.B-6, as
compared to 2,550 petitions for review, see supra note 27.
31. In fiscal year 2005, the court received 995 criminal appeals and 1,511 civil appeals
between private parties. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2005, supra note
29, at 134 tbl.B-6. The total appeals received in these categories combined is 2,506, as
compared, again, with 2,550 petitions for review, see supra note 27.
32. See Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 19.
33. See id.
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were inadmissible or deportable, and then sought relief from expulsion
based on fear of persecution in their countries of origin.34 DOJ
ultimately denied relief, and most (or, at least, a plurality) of the denials
under review appear to be based on findings that the asylum-seekers
were not being truthful.35 Again, however, hard numbers on specific
issues are difficult to come by.
II. PROCEDURAL RESPONSE: KEEPING UP WITH THE NUMBERS
The increase in immigration appeals has caused serious concerns in the
Second Circuit about delays in adjudication and the accumulation of a
backlog. To address these concerns, the court has taken a number of
steps aimed at improving its ability to keep up with the pace at which
appeals are being filed. These include: (1) modifying its mediation
program, (2) cutting down on delays associated with the filing of records
and briefs, (3) establishing a non-argument calendar for asylum-related
appeals, and (4) relying more on central staff attorneys, including
specialized attorneys focused solely on immigration, in the preparation of
bench memoranda and proposed orders.
A. Mediation
The Second Circuit's mediation program, launched in 1974, is the
oldest of the alternative dispute resolution programs in the federal courts
of appeals." Until recently, it was the only such program that regularlyincluded immigration appeals.37 One might assume that mediation would
34. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(a)(1), (b)(1) (2000).
35. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 74.
36. See Irving R. Kaufman, Must Every Appeal Run the Gamut?- The Civil Appeals
Management Plan, 95 YALE L.J. 755. 756-57 (1986). See generally JERRY GOLDMAN, AN
EVALUATION OF THE CIVIL APPEALS MANAGEMENT PLAN: AN EXPERIMENT IN
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1977), reprinted, in part, in MANAGING APPEALS IN
FEDERAL COURTS 21 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1988); ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & ALAN LIND, A
REEVALUATION OF THE CIVIL APPEALS MANAGEMENT PLAN (1983), reprinted, in part,
in MANAGING APPEALS IN FEDERAL COURTS 89, supra; Jerry Goldman, The Civil
Appeals Management Plan: An Experiment in Appellate Procedural Reform, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 1209 (1978).
37. See JUDITH A. MCKENNA, LAURAL L. HOOPER & MARY CLARK, CASE
MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 26-32 (Fed.
Judicial Ctr. 2000), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
CaseManl.pdf/$File/CaseManl.pdf; Lisa Evans, Mediation in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 351, 351-52 (2005) (noting that the Ninth Circuit launched a pilot
program in 2004 to identify groups of immigration cases that might be amenable to
settlement); E-mail from Robert Rack, Med., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
to John Palmer, Assoc. Supervisory Staff Att'y, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit (July 25, 2006, 17:33 EST) (on file with author) (explaining that while immigration
cases are not ineligible for mediation in the Sixth Circuit based on any rule or written
policy, in practice, immigration cases are generally mediated only at the request of a party
2006]
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have little value in an immigration appeal, given that the government has
already invested significant resources in obtaining a final expulsion
order, the alien is facing expulsion, and there are often few terms over
which the parties can bargain. In fact, this has not been the experience in
the Second Circuit, which has seen settlement rates as high as 64% in
immigration appeals during some years.3" Because the lawyers for the
government and the alien on appeal are often not the same lawyers who
represented these parties during the administrative proceedings, simply
forcing these appellate lawyers to review the record and confront the
weaknesses of their cases before they become invested in brief-writing
often proves fruitful. Sometimes the government will agree to a
stipulated vacature of the expulsion order, and a remand to the agency;
sometimes the alien will agree to withdraw the petition, and save the
costs of briefing a losing case. 39  Even when this does not occur,
mediation often proves useful in identifying issues already pending
before the court, allowing cases to be heard in tandem or to be
postponed until issues are decided and then ultimately settled.40
When the increase in immigration appeals began in 2002, all counseled
immigration appeals were generally scheduled for mediation as soon as
administrative records were filed and before being briefed and sent on to
panels of judges.4 ' The bulge in appeals did not affect the mediation
program at first because there were generally long delays in the filing of
the records. By 2004, however, enough records had been filed that the
mediation program began to be overwhelmed with immigration appeals.
or the court); E-mail from David Lombardi, Chief Circuit Med., U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, to John Palmer, Assoc. Supervisory Staff Att'y, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit (July 25, 2006, 17:33 EST) (on file with author) (explaining that
immigration cases were excluded from Ninth Circuit mediation until 2004, and that they
are currently mediated only when requested by a party or referred to mediation by judges
or motions attorneys). See generally ROBERT J. NIEMIC, MEDIATION & CONFERENCE
PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND
LAWYERS (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1997), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
mediconf.pdf/$File/mediconf.pdf. As discussed below, the Second Circuit has now cut
back on its immigration mediation. See infra notes 44-47.
38. See Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 79 tbl.7.
39. See ABCNY REPORT, supra note 17, at 11-12.
40. See, e.g., PARTRIDGE & LIND, supra note 36, at 91, 99. For example, in the late
1990s, dozens of petitions for review involving jurisdictional issues created by the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) were put on hold
pending resolution of these issues in Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998).
Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 47. Once Henderson was decided, these
cases were mostly remanded to the BIA based on settlement agreements between the
parties. See id. at 47 n.232.
41. See MCKENNA, HOOPER & CLARK, supra note 37, at 70.
[Vol. 55:965
Responses to an Expanded Immigration Docket
As a result, in the summer of 2004, the court hired an additional
mediator on a part-time basis, 42 and it began relying on volunteer
mediators from the private bar. These new mediators handled
immigration appeals almost exclusively. In addition, the court adopted a
policy whereby immigration appeals would be sent forward for briefing
and adjudication without mediation if it appeared that they would
otherwise be delayed by the mediation process.43 This arrangement
continued until the summer of 2005.
In August 2005, in anticipation of the rapid filing of thousands of
administrative records (discussed below), the court abandoned regular
mediation in asylum-related appeals altogether. 44 Mediation now occurs
in asylum appeals only when requested by one of the parties45 or by the
46
court in specific cases. In immigration appeals that do not involve an
asylum claim, mandatory mediation continues as before. 7
B. Records and Briefing Deadlines
As already noted, the major cause of delay when the increase in
appeals first started was the time it took for administrative records to be
filed. This began to be alleviated in the fall of 2005, when DOJ came up
with a new arrangement by which it could produce records within weeks
and deliver them to the court on CD-ROMs. 8 This has had a huge effect
on the court's case-processing time; whereas petitions would regularly sit
on the docket with no action for over a year due to record delays, they
can now be briefed and sent to judges within only a few months of being
filed.
Another cause of delay during the first few years after the increase
began was petitioners requesting multiple extensions of time to file
briefs, or simply missing briefing deadlines altogether. Recognizing how
much is at stake in expulsion cases, the court had been relatively
permissive in granting extension requests, and it had been very hesitant
to dismiss cases based on briefing defaults. As the backlog of
immigration cases built up, however, this approach began to change. In
42. Full disclosure: The author was this mediator.
43. See Notice to Second Circuit Litigants, http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/Docs/CAMP/
Notice toLitigants.pdf (effective July 6, 2004).
44. See 2D CIR. R. 0.29(a), (c), available at http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/Docs/Rules/
LR.pdf; Memorandum from John M. Walker, Jr., C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit (Sept. 13, 2005) (on file with author).
45. See 2D CIR. R. 0.29(a), (c).
46. See id. R. 0.29(b).
47. See id. R. 0.29(a), (c).
48. See Memorandum from John M. Walker, Jr., C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, supra note 44.
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July 2004, the court adopted a policy of granting initial thirty-day
extensions as a matter of course, but granting additional requests only in
exceptional circumstances. It also became more strict about dismissing
cases due to briefing defaults. Its current practice is to dismiss petitions
when the petitioner's brief is not filed within fifteen days of the
deadline. 0 In addition, the court will hear cases without the benefit of
the respondent's brief if that brief is not filed within fifteen days of the
respondent's deadline.51
C. Non-Argument Calendar
The most significant change adopted by the Second Circuit has been
the establishment of a "non-argument calendar" whereby appeals
relating to asylum claims can be decided without oral argument 2 Until
2005, the court was unique among the federal courts of appeals in its
reliance on oral argument in almost all types of cases. 3 Whereas all of
the other circuits employed some form of screening program to channel
certain cases down a non-argument track, the only cases in which the
Second Circuit regularly denied oral argument were those in which the
appellant was both pro se and incarcerated 4 All other appeals were
generally scheduled for oral argument unless waived by the parties.5 In
practice, many people ended up waiving oral argument, but the Second
Circuit nonetheless heard oral argument in a higher proportion of cases
than any of the other courts of appeals.56 In fiscal year 1998, for instance,
85% of the Second Circuit's decisions on the merits of counseled appeals
were reached after oral argument, as compared to 54% in the Ninth
Circuit. 7 Looking specifically at appeals from administrative agencies
(such as the BIA), those numbers were again 85% for the Second
Circuit, but only 29% for the Ninth.58
49. See Notice to Second Circuit Litigants, supra note 43.
50. See 2D CIR. R. 0.29(d).
51. Id.
52. See Memorandum from John M. Walker, Jr., C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, supra note 44.
53. See MCKENNA, HOOPER & CLARK, supra note 37, at 8-9, 10 tbl.5 (summarizing
the courts' non-argument practices as of 2000); 2D CIR. R. 0.29 (instituting the Second
Circuit's first non-argument calendar); Pamela A. MacLean, Judges Blast Immigration
Rulings, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 24, 2005, at S1 (noting that the Second Circuit's creation of the
non-argument calendar was "a first for a circuit that prides itself on giving all litigants an
opportunity for oral argument").
54. See MCKENNA, HOOPER & CLARK, supra note 37, at 70, 72.
55. See id. at 70.
56. See, e.g., id. at 11 tbl.6.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 11 tbl.7.
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The Second Circuit initiated its non-argument calendar in October
2005, 5 and the process works as follows: "Any appeal... in which a party
seeks review of a denial of a claim for asylum" is initially sent to a panel
of three judges on the non-argument calendar.60 The judges consider the
appeal sequentially, and any one of them has authority to transfer the
case to the regular argument calendar. The non-argument panel may
dispose of the case in any way it sees fit; it is not limited in terms of
outcome or form of decision. The non-argument panel is also authorized
to hear oral argument itself, rather than transferring the case to a new
panel of the regular argument calendar. If the case is transferred to the
regular argument calendar, it is scheduled for oral argument before a
new panel of judges.
Four non-argument panels convene every week (generally), and each
panel is given twelve cases." Thus, a total of forty-eight cases are
submitted to the non-argument calendar every week.62  The panels
attempt to dispose of all their cases within three weeks of • •o3
D. Reliance on Staff Attorneys
The final change adopted in response to the increase in immigration
appeals has been greater reliance on the court's central staff attorneys.
Like all of the federal appeals courts, the Second Circuit already had a
large central staff responsible for the preparation of bench memoranda
in certain cases. 64 In the Second Circuit, before the establishment of the
non-argument calendar, staff attorneys were responsible for the bench
memoranda in all pro se appeals, as well as in all counseled and pro se
motions. The court's staff attorneys have now been given the added
responsibility of preparing bench memoranda and proposed orders in all
of the appeals on the non-argument calendar. Although all of the staff
attorneys work on these appeals to some extent, the court hired an
additional eight attorneys to form an "immigration unit" that focuses
66
entirely on the non-argument calendar. The idea is that these
specialized attorneys can most efficiently analyze the recurring legal and
59. See Memorandum from John M. Walker, Jr., C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, supra note 44.
60. 2D CIR. R. 0.29.
61. See Memorandum from John M. Walker, Jr., C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, supra note 44.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See McKENNA, HOOPER & CLARK, supra note 37, at 6-7, 6 tbl.4, 68.
65.. See id. at 68.
66. Full disclosure: The author helped to create this unit, and he supervised it from
August 2005 to August 2006.
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factual issues presented in the court's asylum cases, and that they can
serve as resources for the rest of the staff on the complexities of
immigration law.
E. Quantitative Results
One result of all these changes has been a huge increase in the Second
Circuit's output of decisions. The court is now not only adjudicating
enough immigration appeals to prevent the accumulation of a backlog, it
has already shrunk the existing immigration backlog from 5,164 petitions
for review pending on October 1, 2005,67 to 3,242 pending on May 31,
200668-a 37% decrease in just eight months. The court disposed of
approximately 1,200 of these appeals through nonprecedential summary
orders, 69 and 74 through published opinions. 70 The remaining cases were
terminated based on settlements, procedural defaults, or summary
dismissals.71  These figures reflect action taken on the non-argument
calendar, as well as action taken after regular arguments (and action
taken administratively, in the case of settlements and procedural
defaults). Up-to-date information is not yet available on the non-
argument calendar in particular, but as of February 17, 2006, the Staff
Attorneys Office had submitted 927 appeals to panels on this calendar,
and these panels had decided 598 of them-588 through non-
precedential summary orders, and ten through published opinions. The
panels had transferred another forty-eight to the regular argument
calendar to be decided after oral argument, and the remaining 271 were
72
still under review by non-argument panels as of that date.
III. SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE: JUDGING CREDIBILITY
The seventy-four immigration-related opinions that the Second Circuit
published between October 1, 2005 and May 31, 2006 represent, by far,
the most immigration opinions that the court has ever published in any
prior year, let alone any prior eight-month p . 7 3 Tprir yarlet loe i eigt-mnthperiod . his indicates that
67. This figure comes from the ICPSR data described supra note 27.
68. This figure was obtained from the court's internal docket database.
69. This figure was estimated based on a search of Westlaw's database of unreported
Second Circuit decisions (CTA2U) for the phrase "Board of Immigration Appeals" with
dates before June 1, 2006, and after September 30, 2005. That search, conducted on July
25, 2006, yielded 1,235 cases, but it is assumed that not all of these are petitions for review.
70. The complete list of cases is on file with the author.
71. A breakdown on these terminations is not available at this time.
72. These figures were obtained from the court's internal docket database.
73. This can be easily confirmed by a Westlaw search for the phrase "Board of
Immigration Appeals" within the database of reported Second Circuit decisions
(CTA2R).
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there have been substantive, as well as procedural, consequences of the
increase in immigration appeals. At the very least, the sheer volume of
these opinions means that immigration law is evolving at the circuit level
faster than ever before. A wide range of open legal issues are being
resolved, and gaps in the precedent quickly filled. The published
opinions have touched on numerous areas of the law, but one of the most
striking is the issue of credibility determinations-how they are made
and how they are reviewed. While most of the court's asylum cases turn
on the applicants' credibility, it is nonetheless significant that the court
has chosen to address this issue so frequently in published opinions
rather than nonprecedential summary orders.
One might think that there is little room for new legal precedent on
the credibility of witnesses; surely courts long ago worked out the
standards by which fact-finders may reject testimony as not credible and
by which appellate courts review such decisions. In addition, to the
extent that cases turn on credibility, one might expect them to be well-
suited for nonprecedential decisions because they are fact-specific. Yet,
since 2002, the Second Circuit has published a growing number of
opinions in which it has reviewed adverse credibility determinations in
the asylum context; as of July 14, 2006 (the time of writing), this number
had reached forty-one.74  Moreover, these are the court's first-ever
74. Yuanliang Liu v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 455 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 2006); Liang
Chen v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 454 F.3d 103, 105-08 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Guo-Le Huang
v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 142, 146-48 (2d Cir. 2006); Li Zu Guan v. INS, 453 F.3d 129, 138-40
(2d Cir. 2006); Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109-11 (2d Cir. 2006);
Cheng Tong Wang v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 451, 453-54 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam);
Kanacevic v. INS, 448 F.3d 129, 136-38 (2d Cir. 2006); Zhi Wei Pang v. Bureau of
Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 448 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2006); Tu Lin v. Gonzales,
446 F.3d 395, 403 (2d Cir. 2006); Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289,
297 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Diallo v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 624, 629-34 (2d Cir. 2006);
Rui Ying Lin v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2006); Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84,
89-91 (2d Cir. 2006); Pavlova v. INS, 441 F.3d 82, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2006); Chung Sai Zheng v.
Gonzales, 440 F.3d 76, 79-81 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam); You Hao Yang v. BIA, 440 F.3d
72, 76 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Ming Shi Xue v. BIA, 439 F.3d 111, 113-14 (2d Cir.
2006); Singh v. BIA, 438 F.3d 145, 147 (2d Cir. 2006); Tandia v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 245 (2d
Cir. 2006); Sail v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 229, 235-36 (2d Cir. 2006); Qyteza v. Gonzales, 437
F.3d 224, 226 (2d Cir. 2006); Borovikova v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 435 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir.
2006); Ming Xia Chen v. BIA, 435 F.3d 141,143 (2d Cir. 2006); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't
of Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 157-60 (2d Cir. 2006); Yu Yin Yang v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 84, 85-
86 (2d Cir. 2005); Latifi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 103, 104-05 (2d Cir. 2005); Majidi v.
Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005); Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 428 F.3d 391,
400-02 (2d Cir. 2005); Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 113-14 (2d Cir.
2005); Chun Gao v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 122, 131 (2d Cir. 2005); Yun-Zui Guan v.
Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 398-99 (2d Cir. 2005); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep't of Justice,
426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005); Zhou Yi Ni v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 424 F.3d 172, 174 (2d
Cir. 2005); Jin Yu Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 413 F.3d 188, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2005); Xu
Duan Dong v. Ashcroft, 406 F.3d 110, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2005); Jin Hui Gao v. U.S. Att'y
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published opinions squarely reviewing adverse credibility determinations
in asylum cases, a class of cases that has been in existence (essentially)
since 1980;71 indeed, they are almost the court's only published opinions
involving credibility review in immigration cases of any time, going back
as far as the 1952 enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act.76
In fact, the current focus on credibility is reminiscent of a much earlier
wave of federal court litigation, one that occurred some 100 years ago
during the implementation of the Chinese exclusion laws. That episode
is distinguishable in a number of ways from the present situation, but it
also bears remarkable similarities, offering clues as to why credibility is
currently receiving so much attention from the Second Circuit.
Specifically, both the Chinese exclusion litigation and the present asylum
litigation appear to involve clashes between, on the one hand, the
skepticism and fact-finding shortcuts of harried front-line adjudicators
who view masses of cases in the aggregate, and on the other hand, the
case-by-case, record-oriented approach of more removed reviewing
courts. Whereas the skepticism implicated in the Chinese exclusion
litigation was colored by overtly racist attitudes 7 the current skepticism
appears to stem instead from a variety of factors. I propose that one of
these factors is the paradigm of the "new asylum seeker" that emerged in
the 1980s.
A. The "New Asylum Seekers"
In the 1960s and 1970s, the governments of North America and
Western Europe came to view refugee movements as distant,
controllable phenomena that were more issues of foreign policy than
domestic affairs.78 Refugees fled from their homes in Asia, Africa, and
Gen., 400 F.3d 963, 963-64 (2d Cir. 2005); Zhou Yun Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 74, 79 (2d
Cir. 2004); Xusheng Shi v. BIA, 374 F.3d 64, 65-66 (2d Cir. 2004); Ramsameachire v.
Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 174-75 (2d Cir. 2004); Wu Biao Chen v. INS, 344 F.3d 272, 273, 275
(2d Cir. 2003); Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 301, 312 (2d Cir. 2003).
75. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN & HIROSHI
MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 831-33 (5th ed.
2003) (discussing the 1980 Refugee Act and earlier forms of persecution-based relief).
76. The limited number of other opinions in which the court actually reviewed
adverse credibility determinations in the immigration context include: Kokkinis v. Dist.
Dir. of INS, 429 F.2d 938, 939-40, 942 (2d Cir. 1970) (deferring to special inquiry officer's
decision to credit a witness over the petitioner, leading to a finding of deportability based
on marriage fraud); United States ex rel. Exarchou v. Murff, 265 F.2d 504, 505, 507 (2d Cir.
1959) (reversing special inquiry officer's adverse credibility finding, which had led to a
denial of voluntary departure).
77. See, e.g., Kitty Calavita, The Paradoxes of Race, Class, Identity, and "Passing":
Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 1882-1910, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 26-27, 30-31,
34-35 (2000).
78. See Gibney, supra note 9, at 26.
[Vol. 55:965
Responses to an Expanded Immigration Docket
Latin America into neighboring countries within those regions, and
remained there unless invited to resettle in third countries through
organized programs.79 Refugees were easy to identify because they
tended to move in masses and live in refugee camps, and the world's
wealthier states could specially screen and select refugees from the
countries of first asylum before inviting them to enter.'s Moreover, the
decision to take in refugees was often grounded in cold war geopolitics,
and the opposition of xenophobic electorates in the West could be
overcome by portraying refugee admissions as central to the struggle
against communism.8'
While this view of orderly, controlled refugee admissions linked to
foreign policy or national security goals was necessarily an incomplete
generalization,2 it nonetheless crystallized into an image of "traditional"
asylum seekers. That image then stood in contrast to the "new asylum
79. See Martin, supra note 9, at 2-4, 9-10.
80. See id. at 9-10; Doris Meissner, Reflections on the U.S. Refugee Act of 1980, in
THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980S, supra note 9, at 60. As
former INS Commissioner Doris Meissner put it: "Our historical understanding and policy
conception of refugees and refugee situations was that of an overseas phenomenon. As a
nation, we saw ourselves responding to events that occurred far away, and we saw refugees
as persons whom we screened and chose before they could come to the United States."
Id.
81. See Gibney, supra note 9, at 26-27. On the politicized nature of U.S. refugee
admissions during this period, see generally GIL LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLAN,
CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES AND AMERICA'S HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE
PRESENT 25-48 (1986); Ira J. Kurzban, A Critical Analysis of Refugee Law, 36 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 865 (1982). Writing in 1982, Professor Ira Kurzban concluded that "[sjince 1948, our
government has used the refugee admissions process for political purposes. The result is a
selection and admission process that is promoted and ultimately molded by the unique
value of refugees as political metaphors of alleged communist oppression." Id. at 866-67
(footnote omitted).
82. See Martin, supra note 9, at 2, 8 (acknowledging that the placement of the "new
asylum seeker" in historical context leaves out "certain exceptions and qualifications"
from earlier periods). Important exceptions to the image of "traditional" asylum seekers
gathering in a neighboring country of first asylum, and remaining there unless invited to
resettle farther afield, are the massive and scattered refugee movements from the
Ottoman and Russian Empires, and the European dictatorships of the first half of the
twentieth century. See Gilbert Jaeger, Irregular Movements: The Concept and Possible
Solutions, in THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980S, supra note 9, at
28-29. Ironically, it was those movements that had spawned the modern system of
international refugee protection to begin with. See, e.g., Jean-Yves Carlier, The Geneva
Refugee Definition and the 'Theory of the Three Scales', in REFUGEE RIGHTS AND
REALITIES: EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONCEPTS AND REGIMES 37, 38 (Frances
Nicholson & Patrick Twomey eds., 1999); Dani~le Joly, A New Asylum Regime in Europe,
in REFUGEE RIGHTS AND REALITIES: EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONCEPTS AND
REGIMES, supra, at 336-37; Jerzy Sztucki, Who is a Refugee? The Convention Definition:
Universal or Obsolete, in REFUGEE RIGHTS AND REALITIES: EVOLVING
INTERNATIONAL CONCEPTS AND REGIMES, supra, at 55-56.
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seekers" who emerged in the 1980s. Unlike "traditional" asylum seekers,
"new asylum seekers" did not wait in refugee camps for organized
resettlement programs, but arrived directly in North America, Western
Europe, and elsewhere." They came by sea and by air in increasingly
large numbers, often making use of smugglers and false documents.84
This may seem today like an obvious byproduct of globalization, but
governments at that time were startled by the emergence of these
"intercontinental jet-age asylum-seekers."" More importantly, the loss
of control over arrivals, the economic pressures driving migrants from
poor states to wealthy ones, and the subsequent end of the cold war all
contributed to bringing asylum policy down from the "high politics" of
foreign affairs and national security to the "day to day electoral politics"
of such issues as unemployment, national identity, and the welfare state.86
The result has been an increasingly skeptical reaction toward asylum
claims in North America and Western Europe.87  This skepticism is
exacerbated by the inherent difficulties of corroborating an asylum claim
and the added difficulties of corroborating such a claim after the asylum
seeker has crossed not just a land border, but whole continents and88
oceans. It is further exacerbated when high-volume law offices and
"travel agencies" end up standardizing peoples' stories so that they can
churn out large quantities of cookie-cutter filings.8 9 The skepticism has
manifested itself, in part, in a series of restrictive measures aimed at
83. Martin, supra note 9, at 4.
84. See id. at 1, 5.
85. See id. at 1 (quoting Report of the Executive Comm. of the High Commissioner's
Programme (35th Sess.) 76, U.N. DOC. A/AC.96/651 (1984)).
86. Gibney, supra note 9, at 28 (emphasis omitted). In addition, the fact "that the
overwhelming majority of [these] asylum seekers [were] of non-European origin" fueled
xenophobic reactions. Jaeger, supra note 82, at 36-37 (quoting the statement of a
government representative at the consultations on the arrivals of asylum-seekers and
refugees in Europe, held in Geneva in 1985).
87. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties". A
Response to David Martin, 44 U. PIr. L. REV. 237, 253-56 (1983) [hereinafter Aleinikoff,
A Response to David Martin]; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Political Asylum in the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Republic of France: Lessons for the United States, 17 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 183, 185 & n.14, 191, 199-200, 223-25, 231 (1984) [hereinafter
Aleinikoff, Political Asylum] (discussing skeptical official reactions in the United States
and West Germany, and noting growing pressure for restrictive immigration measures in
France); Gibney, supra note 9, at 26-33; Stephen H. Legomsky, Political Asylum and the
Theory of Judicial Review, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1205, 1208-09 (1989); Martin, supra note 9, at
8-11.
88. See Stephen Yale-Loehr & John R.B. Palmer, Evidentiary Issues in Asylum Cases,
6 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 595, 595 (2001).
89. See Palmer, supra note 2.
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controlling and deterring the arrival of asylum seekers. 0 In addition, it
has manifested itself more generally in the tendency of adjudicators to
reject asylum claims based on adverse credibility determinations. 9
In the United States, the "new asylum seekers" started arriving,
unexpectedly, almost immediately after the enactment in 1980 of the
country's first statutory provision for asylum. 9' At the time of its
enactment, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) anticipated
that the provision would be used by only a very small number of people.93
The legislation authorized 5,000 successful asylum applicants to adjust
their status annually to that of lawful permanent resident,94 and even this
number "was seen as most generous and highly unlikely to be needed."9'
Within six months, however, more than 100,000 asylum claims had been
lodged under the new legislation, largely by Cubans, Iranians, and
• 96
Nicaraguans. While claims dropped off for a number of years after that,
they rose to even higher levels at the end of the 1980s and throughout the
first half of the 1990s.
97
90. See Aleinikoff, Political Asylum, supra note 87, at 188-95, 199-211; Gibney, supra
note 9, at 28; Joly, supra note 82, at 341-55.
91. See Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States:
Summary Report of an Empirical Study of the Adjudication of Asylum Claims Before the
Immigration Court, 2 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 252, 256-59 (1990); Ilene Durst, Lost in
Translation: Why Due Process Demands Deference to the Refugee's Narrative, 53
RUTGERS L. REV. 127, 137-45, 160-74 (2000); Elwin Griffith, Asylum and Withholding of
Deportation-Challenges to the Alien After the Refugee Act of 1980, 12 LoY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 515, 529-34 (1990).
92. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 208(a), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2000)); see Aleinikoff, Political Asylum, supra note 87, at 184;
Meissner, supra note 80, at 60.
93. See Aleinikoff, Political Asylum, supra note 87, at 184; CHARLES B. KEELY, U.S.
COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, THE CHALLENGE OF MASS ASYLUM 3-4 (1994),
available at http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/respapers/tco-jan94.pdf; Meissner, supra note
80, at 60.
94. Refugee Act of 1980 § 209(b), 94 Stat. at 106.
95. Meissner, supra note 80, at 60; see also KEELY, supra note 93, at 3-4 (noting that
the number had "no particular basis" and "seemed more than sufficient for the trickle of
persons who sought asylum").
96. See Meissner, supra note 80, at 60-61. This figure is only a rough estimate, as
there are no reliable data from this period on the precise number of asylum applications
filed. See Aleinikoff, Political Asylum, supra note 87, at 184 n.12, 186-88, 186 n.16.
97. See OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STATS., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. (DHS), 2002
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 65 tbl.18 (2003), available at
http:lluscis.govlgraphicslsharedlaboutuslstatisticslYearbook2002.pdf. The DHS statistics
show only those asylum applications filed with the INS and DHS, not applications filed,
defensively, in immigration courts only after the commencement of removal proceedings.
Id. at 57-58. The total number of asylum applications filed each year is therefore greater
than that reported by DHS. See id. at 58.
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During all of this time, however, only a handful of asylum claims
worked their way into the federal courts. 98 For a number of reasons,
asylum litigation was focused at the administrative level, and lawyers
tended to seek judicial review in only exceptional circumstances.99
Adverse credibility determinations often did not present such
circumstances and appear to have been infrequently challenged in the
Second Circuit.I°  Credibility was at issue in other circuits' asylum
opinions in the 1980s and 1990s,' but the Second Circuit's decisions
during this period tended to hinge on the elements of the statutory
asylum standard itself, such as the protected grounds on which
persecution must be based02 and the various bars to relief.' 3
B. The "New Asylum Seekers" in the Second Circuit
This began to change at the end of the 1990s. At this time, people
were increasingly turning to the federal courts for judicial review of
expulsion orders in general, and asylum claims were a prominent feature
of this expanded litigation. °4 Although this initial bulge in appeals was
small in comparison to the massive increase that followed in mid-2002, 5
it nonetheless brought questions of proof before the Second Circuit,
leading the court to issue a series of precedential opinions on the
evidence that may be required of asylum seekers.
98. See Martin, supra note 12, at 1325; see also Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra
note 2, at 43-44, 46 fig.1 (showing the low number of immigration appeals overall during
this period).
99. See Martin, supra note 12, at 1325.
100. This assertion is based on the fact that there are few Second Circuit opinions
reviewing adverse credibility determinations during this period. See supra note 76.
101. See, e.g., Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 342 (9th Cir. 1994); Damaize-Job v. INS,
787 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986); Canjura-Flores v. INS, 784 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir.
1985).
102. See, e.g., Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1028 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that "the plain
meaning of the phrase 'persecution on account of the victim's political opinion,' does not
mean persecution solely on account of the victim's political opinion"); Sotelo-Aquije v.
Slattery, 17 F.3d 33, 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that evidence compelled conclusion that
a Peruvian man had a "well-founded fear of persecution" on account of political opinion
where he was targeted by the Peruvian Shining Path guerillas for actively opposing that
group); Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 663-64 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that being beaten and
raped by Salvadoran guerillas did not make a woman a member of a "particular social
group" for purposes of asylum eligibility).
103. See, e.g., Ofosu v. McElroy, 98 F.3d 694, 701 (2d Cir. 1996).
104. See Benson, supra note 7. The courts probably began to see more asylum cases at
this time because there had been a huge bulge of asylum applications at the agency level in
the mid-1990s, and these were probably just beginning to work their way through the BIA.
See OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STATS., supra note 97, at 65 tbl.18.
105. See Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 43-44, 46 figi.
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The first of these was Abankwah v. INS,0 6 issued in July 1999, in which
the court touched on the extent to which an asylum claim may be denied
based on insufficient documentary corroboration. ' 7 The court held that
the BIA had been "too exacting both in the quantity and quality of
evidence that it required."' 8 Noting that DOJ regulations do not require
that an asylum applicant's credible testimony be corroborated, the court
stressed that "a genuine refugee does not flee her native country armed
with affidavits, expert witnesses, and extensive documentation. '"10 9 The
court returned to the corroboration issue the following year in Diallo v.
INS,"° holding that before denying an asylum claim solely for lack of
corroborating evidence, an IJ must first explain "why it is reasonable...
to expect such corroboration," and why the applicant's "proffered
explanations for the lack of such corroboration are insufficient..1 . It
applied this principle again in 2001 in Alvarado-Carillo v. INS,1 12 and in
2003 in Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft."'
In Jin Shui Qiu, the court also concluded that the BIA had been too
exacting in its demands for testimonial specificity in the absence of an
adverse credibility finding."1 4 Noting that vague testimony might well
generate suspicion and lead a fact-finder to "probe for incidental details,
seeking to draw out inconsistencies that would support a finding of lack
of credibility,"'1 5 the court held that credible testimony is "too vague"
only if it does not identify the facts necessary to make out a prima facie
case." 6 The court explained that
since the list of circumstantial details can be expanded
indefinitely, a legal standard that empowers an [IJ] or the BIA
to rule against a petitioner who fails to anticipate the particular
set of details that the fact-finder desires (but does not request,
through questions directed to the applicant) is no standard at
all. It would enable the administrative decisionmaker to reject
whichever applicants that fact-finder happens to disfavor."7
106. 185 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1999).
107. Id. at 21, 24.
108. Id. at 24.
109. Id. at 24, 26.
110. 232 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2000).
111. Id. at 290.
112. 251 F.3d 44, 54-55 (2d Cir. 2001).
113. 329 F.3d 140, 153-54 (2d Cir. 2003).
114. See id. at 150-52.
115. Id. at 152.
116. Id. at 151.
117. Id. at 151-52.
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While Abankwah, Diallo, Alvarado-Carillo, and Jin Shui Qiu did not
deal squarely with adverse credibility findings, they set the stage for
much of the credibility review that followed. All of them took issue with
what appeared to be overly skeptical adjudicators making evidentiary
demands that failed to take into account the difficulties genuine refugees
face in presenting and documenting asylum claims.' 8 Diallo, Alvarado-
Carillo, and Jin Shui Qiu established the principle that the agency must
make its adverse credibility findings explicit, and must distinguish
between decisions based on a lack of credibility and those based on a
lack of corroborating evidence." 9 In the absence of an adverse credibility
finding, lack of corroborating evidence might be an independent basis for
denying an asylum claim only if the IJ has identified the missing
corroboration, explained why it could be reasonably expected, and
explained why any reasons proffered by the applicant for its absence are
insufficient."O The cases also indirectly implicated the standards
governing adverse credibility determinations. In Diallo, for instance, the
court noted that minor, isolated inconsistencies need not be fatal to an
asylum applicant's credibility. 2' In Jin Shui Qiu, the court noted that
before relying on vague testimony for an adverse credibility finding, an IJ
would be wise to first "probe for incidental details" so as to generate the
record needed to support such a finding.1
22
The first precedential opinion in which the court squarely reviewed an
adverse credibility determination in the asylum context was Secaida-
123Rosales v. INS, issued in 2003. Secaida was a Guatemalan asylum
seeker who claimed to have been threatened in the early 1990s by police
and paramilitary death squads for supporting a neighborhood committee
118. See id. at 150-53; Alvarado-Carillo v. INS, 251 F.3d 44, 54-55 (2d Cir. 2001);
Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 289 (2d Cir. 2000); Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18, 26 (2d Cir.
1999).
119. See, e.g., Diallo, 232 F.3d at 287.
120. See id. at 290. The Diallo opinion expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit's rule that
corroboration may never be the sole basis for denying an asylum claim. See id. at 286
(rejecting the standard laid out in Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 992 (9th Cir.
2000)). As the court later recognized in Jin Shui Qiu, however, this statement is not
necessarily part of the holding in Diallo, since it was not strictly necessary to the result.
Jin Shti Qiu, 329 F.3d at 154 n.11. Although the court has not returned to this issue,
Congress has. In the REAL ID Act of 2005, Congress provided (with respect to asylum
applications filed on or after May 11, 2005), "[w]here the trier of fact determines that the
applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such
evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot
reasonably obtain the evidence." Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 101(a)(3), (h)(2), 119 Stat. 231,
303, 305 (codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 2006)).
121. Diallo, 232 F.3d at 288.
122. See Jin Shui Qiu, 329 F.3d at 152.
123. 331 F.3d 297, 301 (2d Cir. 2003).
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involved in a land dispute with the government. An IJ denied his claim
on adverse credibility grounds, primarily because Secaida had omitted
from his written asylum application two facts to which he later testified:
that his uncle's assassin had shot at Secaida after killing the uncle, and
that a friend had been killed during a student strike. In addition, the IJ
"pointed to the implausibility of Secaida's safely continuing employment
and procuring a new national identity card while subject to [government]
persecution.' ' 26 The IJ also found that Secaida had failed to produce
sufficient corroborating evidence, and had given confused answers in
response to several questions on cross-examination.
1 27
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the IJ was overly stringent in
her demands.128 In doing so, the court laid out a basic framework for
credibility review. While recognizing the deference required under the
substantial evidence standard, the court held that adverse credibility
determinations must nonetheless be grounded in the record and
supported by adequate reasoning. 1 9 The court explained that an IJ must
provide "specific, cogent" reasons that "bear a legitimate nexus" to the
credibility determination, and must not base the determination on
"speculation and conjecture." 30 While inconsistent testimony and other
discrepancies may support an adverse credibility determination, they
must be material to the asylum claim and "substantial" when measured
against the record as a whole. '  Finally, the IJ's application of an
"inappropriately stringent standard" in judging credibility is reviewed de
novo as legal, rather than factual, error.131
The court held that the omissions from Secaida's asylum application
could not support the adverse credibility determination because one (the
allegation that Secaida had been shot at) was insubstantial when
measured against the rest of the evidence, and the other (the allegation
that his friend had been killed) was collateral to Secaida's asylum
claim.133 The court also held that the purported implausibility was based
on flawed reasoning, and that the IJ had been too exacting in her
124. Id. at 301-04.
125. Id. at 308-09.
126. Id. at 308.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 312.
129. See id. at 307, 312.
130. See id. at 307 (citing and quoting Chen Yun Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272
(3d Cir. 2003); Ahmad v. INS, 163 F.3d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 1999); Senathirajah v. INS, 157
F.3d 210, 216 (3d Cir. 1998); Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1381 (9th Cir. 1990)).
131. See id. at 308.
132. See id. at 307 (citing Aguilera-Cota, 914 F.2d at 1380).
133. See id. at 309.
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demands for additional corroboration. Finally, the court held that
Secaida's confusion demonstrated difficulty with the language rather
than a lack of credibility.
3 5
Secaida-Rosales was the first of what has proven to be a long (and
growing) line of Second Circuit opinions on credibility. In many of these
opinions, the court has upheld IJ decisions, emphasizing the deference
owed to administrative findings of fact. In Wu Biao Chen v. INS, 136 for
instance, the court held that the petitioner could not overcome an
adverse credibility determination merely by offering "ex post
justifications" for the discrepancies in his case. 37  The substantial
evidence standard, the court held, "requires Chen to do more than
simply offer a 'plausible' alternative theory; instead, to warrant reversal
of the BIA's decision, he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder
would be compelled to credit his testimony.', 3 8 The court reiterated this
deference in Zhou Yun Zhang v. INS, 39 explaining that "the law must
entrust some official with responsibility to hear an applicant's asylum
claim, and the IJ has the unique advantage among all officials involved in
the process of having heard directly from the applicant.'
140
In other opinions, however, this deference has been overcome by flaws
in the administrative findings, or in the process by which those findings
were reached. For instance, the court has vacated adverse credibility
determinations where it has found purported discrepancies to be
non-existent. 4 It has also done so where the J has reliedinsignificant or 0- .
134. See id. at 310-12.
135. See id. at 312.
136. 344 F.3d 272 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
137. Id. at 275.
138. Id. at 275-76 (citing INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 & n.1 (1992)).
139. 386 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2004).
140. Id. at 73.
141. See, e.g., Pavtova v. INS, 441 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that an
applicant's "minor fault" in the medical terminology used to describe the condition of her
ovaries was, "at most, the sort of de minimis, nonmaterial inconsistency that we have often
stated may not form the basis for an adverse credibility determination"); Chung Sai Zheng
v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (holding that an applicant's
medically erroneous description of his vasectomy as involving an operation on his
"muscles," and a discrepancy on the applicant's child's birth certificate regarding the
location of the birth, were "patently insufficient to support an adverse credibility
finding"); Latifi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 103, 105 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that a
determination could not be supported by "insignificant and trivial" discrepancies); Jin
Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 114-15 (2d Cir. 2005); Chun Gao v. Gonzales,
424 F.3d 122, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2005); Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 308-09 (2d Cir.
2003).
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on mere speculation unsupported by the record.4 2  Similarly, it has
vacated where the applicant has offered a significant explanation for a
• • 143
discrepancy and the IJ has failed to address this explanation. In all, as
of July 14, 2006, the court has pointed out flaws in the agency's adverse
credibility findings in twenty-one of its post-2002 published opinions.'"
Of these, remand has been required in seventeen, 145 while four others
have been upheld in spite of the flaws, based on the conclusion that
146
remand would be futile. Finally, the court has published opinions
upholding credibility findings as free of flaws in twenty cases.147  The
142. See, e.g., Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2006);
Pavlova, 441 F.3d at 88-89; Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir.
2006); Secaida-Rosales, 331 F.3d at 309-10.
143. See, e.g., Latif, 430 F.3d at 105-06; Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 428 F.3d
391, 403 (2d Cir. 2005).
144. See Yuanliang Liu v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 455 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 2006); Guo-
Le Huang v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 142, 146-48 (2d Cir. 2006); Li Zu Guan v. INS, 453 F.3d
129, 138-40 (2d Cir. 2006); Li Hua Lin, 453 F.3d at 109-11; Zhi Wei Pang v. Bureau of
Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 448 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2006); Tu Lin v. Gonzales,
446 F.3d 395, 403 (2d Cir. 2006); Rui Ying Lin v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir.
2006); Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 89-91 (2d Cir. 2006); Pavlova v. INS, 441 F.3d 82, 91-
92 (2d Cir. 2006); Chung Sai Zheng v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2006) (per
curiam); You Hao Yang v. BIA, 440 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Ming Shi Xue
v. BIA, 439 F.3d 111, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2006); Singh v. BIA, 438 F.3d 145, 147 (2d Cir. 2006);
Tandia v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 245, 249-50 (2d Cir. 2006); Sall v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 229,
235-36 (2d Cir. 2006); Qyteza v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 224, 226-28 (2d Cir. 2006); Xiao Ji
Chen, 434 F.3d at 158-60; Latif, 430 F.3d at 105-06; Cao He Lin, 428 F.3d at 402-03; Jin
Chen, 426 F.3d at 114-15; Chun Gao, 424 F.3d at 131; Secaida-Rosales, 331 F.3d at 312.
145. See Guo-Le Huang, 453 F.3d at 151; Li Zu Guan, 453 F.3d at 142; Li Hua Lin, 453
F.3d at 112; Zhi Wei Pang, 448 F.3d at 112; Rui Ying Lin, 445 F.3d at 136; Rizal, 442 F.3d
at 93; Pavlova, 441 F.3d at 92; You Hao Yang, 440 F.3d at 76; Chung Sai Zheng, 440 F.3d
at 81; Ming Shi Xue, 439 F.3d at 128; Singh, 438 F.3d at 150; Tandia, 437 F.3d at 251; Sall,
437 F.3d at 236; Latifi, 430 F.3d at 105-06; Cao He Lin, 428 F.3d at 395; Jin Chen, 426 F.3d
at 107; Chun Gao, 424 F.3d at 132; Secaida-Rosales, 331 F.3d at 313.
146. See Yuanliang Liu, 455 F.3d at 118 (remanding on the issue of the frivolousness
finding, but not on the adverse credibility finding); Qyteza, 437 F.3d at 228; Tu Lin, 446
F.3d at 403; Xiao Ji Chen, 434 F.3d at 149.
147. See Liang Chen v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 454 F.3d 103, 105-08 (2d Cir. 2006) (per
curiam); Cheng Tong Wang v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 451, 453-54 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam);
Kanacevic v. INS, 448 F.3d 129, 136-38 (2d Cir. 2006); Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 297 (2d Cir. 2006); Diallo v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 624, 629-34
(2d Cir. 2006); Singh, 438 F.3d at 149-50; Borovikova v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 435 F.3d 151,
161-62 (2d Cir. 2006); Ming Xia Chen v. BIA, 435 F.3d 141, 144-46 (2d Cir. 2006); Yun-Zui
Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 400 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Yu Yin Yang v.
Gonzales, 431 F.3d 84, 85-86 (2d Cir. 2005); Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir.
2005); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522-23 (2d Cir. 2005); Zhou
Yi Ni v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 424 F.3d 172, 174 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Jin Yu Lin v.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, 413 F.3d 188, 191-92 (2d Cir. 2005); Xu Duan Dong v. Ashcroft, 406
F.3d 110, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Jin Hui Gao v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 400 F.3d 963,
964 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Zhou Yun Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 66 (2d Cir. 2004);
Xusheng Shi v. BIA, 374 F.3d 64, 65-66 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Ramsameachire v.
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standards laid out in all of these published opinions have then guided the
court's adjudication of the hundreds of petitions for review that have
been decided by nonprecedential summary order.
The substance of the court's opinions, together with the fact that the
court has felt the need to publish so much on credibility in general,
suggests an underlying tension between the court and the administrative
adjudicators whose decisions are under review. Interestingly, it is a
tension that also surfaced during the wave of litigation over the country's
exclusion of Chinese laborers some 100 years ago.141
C. Chinese Exclusion Litigation
The Chinese exclusion laws are most widely remembered for their
overt racism, 49 and for the Supreme Court's deference to congressional
and executive authority over immigration.5 However, a lesser known
aspect of the episode is the degree to which federal courts became
involved in reviewing factual findings about who fell within the exclusion
laws' purview. 51  Such decisions often hinged on credibility, with the
excluded Chinese claiming non-laborer status or U.S. citizenship, and
administrative decision-makers disbelieving them.52  As Professor
Gerald L. Neuman describes it,
[t]he officials saw themselves as confronting a mass of
fraudulent claims backed by perjured witnesses suborned by
unscrupulous attorneys in the pay of a Chinese conspiracy. The
bureaucracy believed itself powerless to catch all the frauds, but
openly announced a strategy of detecting deceit by isolating
arriving Chinese in holding centers and then trapping them in
minor testimonial inconsistencies.153
Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 2004); Wu Biao Chen v. INS, 344 F.3d 272, 275-76 (2d
Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
148. This comparison was first suggested to me by Professor Gerald L. Neuman.
149. See, e.g., ALEINIKOFF, MARTIN & MOTOMURA, supra note 75, at 146; Kitty
Calavita, supra note 77, at 34.
150. See, e.g., United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 261-63 (1905); Lem Moon Sing v.
United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547-50 (1895); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese
Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 595-96, 603-04, 606 (1889). See generally Louis Henkin,
The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its
Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 854-63 (1987); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law
After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 550-54).
151. See generally LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE
IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995).
152. See id. at 43, 58-65.
153. Gerald L. Neuman, The Constitutional Requirement of "Some Evidence," 25 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 631, 638-39 (1988) (footnote omitted).
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When the Chinese challenged their expulsion orders in habeas corpus
petitions before the federal district courts, they had a relatively high rate
of success.'54 In fact, it is through these challenges that the courts first
established what became known as the "some evidence" requirement of
due process."' In United States v. Chin Len, 56 for instance, the Second
Circuit overturned an administrative decision denying admission, based
on an adverse credibility determination, to a Chinese man who claimed
U.S. citizenship. 157
The agency' 5 had found Chin Len's citizenship claim not credible
based on (1) discrepancies in his testimony and that of one of his
witnesses, and (2) a finding that Chin Len had submitted a fraudulent
document-a certificate showing that the U.S. Commissioner for the
Northern District of New York had previously adjudged him to be a U.S.
citizen. 9  It is not entirely clear what the purported discrepancies
consisted of, but both the district court and the Second Circuit found
them to be insufficiently significant to support the agency's
determination.'60 The district court concluded that "[o]n the whole, the
stories agree[d] better than the average of honest witnesses testifying to
transactions that occurred nine or ten years ago.' ' 6' The Second Circuit
characterized the discrepancies as "slight and . . . wholly
inconsequential."'62  Although the date and seal on the certificate did
appear to be altered, the court concluded that was not, on its own, an
indication of fraud.16 Further, while Chin Len had apparently testified
that he had obtained the certificate in Hong Kong, the court concluded
that this was an honest mistake, as he had clearly been confusing the
certificate with another document.'6
154. See SALYER, supra note 151, at 80 tbl.3, 81.
155. See Neuman, supra note 153, at 637-41. For a recent application of the standard
in the Second Circuit, see Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F.3d 649, 655 (2d Cir. 2004) ("For a prison
disciplinary proceeding to provide due process there must be, among other things, 'some
evidence' to support the sanction imposed." (quoting Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156,
163 (2d Cir. 2001))), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1187 (2005).
156. 187 F. 544 (2d Cir. 1911).
157. Id. at 550.
158. At this time, it was the Department of Commerce and Labor that was responsible
for implementing the Chinese exclusion laws.
159. Chin Len, 187 F. at 545.
160. Id. at 546, 549.
161. Id. at 546.
162. Id. at 548.
163. Id. at 549-50.
164. Id. at 549.
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Chin Len was decided in 1911,165 when judicial deference to the
administrative decisions in Chinese exclusion cases was at its maximum.
The Supreme Court had already ruled that administrative decisions
denying admission were final, and could not be overturned absent a
showing that the hearing was unfair.' 66 Although it would later rule that
the denial of a non-frivolous citizenship claim in deportation proceedings
required a judicial determination de novo, that was not until 1922.161
Consequently, the question before the Second Circuit in Chin Len was
whether the administrative proceedings had been so deficient as to
deprive the petitioner of a fair hearing. The court held that they had.I"
The fact that Chin Len was claiming citizenship as opposed to some
other exemption from Chinese exclusion probably made the courts more
sympathetic to his case.170  However, the "some evidence" test was
applied to overturn denials of claims for relief other than citizenship as
well."' Moreover, the courts' reliance on the deferential "some
evidence" test was only a result of Congress' attempts to cut off judicial
review of the administrative decisions in these cases.17 Before this
occurred, the courts were reviewing expulsion decisions de novo, and the
clash between judicial and administrative methods was even more
pronounced. 173
This was not, as one might guess, a simple matter of the courts
overturning decisions infected with racial bias. As Professor Lucy E.
Salyer explains in her comprehensive history of the episode, many of the
district court and court of appeals judges held anti-immigrant sentiments
that were at least as strong as those of the administrative decision-
makers.7 4 Indeed, some of the federal judges had been directly involved
in pushing through anti-Chinese legislation before joining the courts.175
Instead, it appears that the success of the Chinese in federal court was
based on a tension between the "different institutional orientation and
practices" of the courts and the administrative agency. Salyer
concludes that a key difference was the evidentiary standard employed
165. Id. at 544.
166. See Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 12 (1908); United States v. Ju Toy, 198
U.S. 253, 261-62 (1905).
167. See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1922).
168. See Chin Len, 187 F. at 550.
169. Id.
170. See SALYER, supra note 151, at 207-12.
171. See Neuman, supra note 153, at 640.
172. See SALYER, supra note 151, at 194-207.
173. See id. at 69-93.
174. See id. at 72.
175. See id.
176. Id. at 81-82.
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by each: "Unlike the [court], the [administrative adjudicator] did not feel
bound to land a Chinese person when there were no discrepancies in his
story. If the [adjudicator] felt the story was fraudulent or if he could find
minor discrepancies, he would deny the Chinese entry." '177
The federal judges, on the other hand, "were less willing to deviate
from legal tradition" even though they "strongly supported exclusion and
believed that the Chinese coming before them were making fraudulent
claims to evade that policy."'78 They decided cases "on the evidence
presented, not on intuition or personal belief."'7 9  The judges thus
"clearly felt torn between their personal beliefs and judicial evidentiary
standards. They all believed that Chinese lied in the proceedings, but
judicial norms did not allow them to take that belief into consideration
unless there was proof of perjury. '8
D. Tension Over Credibility Determinations
Clearly there are important differences between the Chinese exclusion
litigation and the current situation faced by the courts. Among other
things, the Js and BIA members of today are far more professional,
better trained, and better equipped to adjudicate cases fairly and
accurately than the administrative adjudicators charged with
implementing the Chinese exclusion laws.' 8' Moreover, in drawing a
comparison between the two groups, I do not mean to suggest that
today's administrative adjudicators are infected with the same racism and
nativist biases as the adjudicators of the past.
Differences aside, however, it is hard not to be struck by the
similarities between the two periods. Then, as now, we see a
confrontation between administrators and courts over how to judge
credibility. The courts' opinions in both periods take issue with the
administrative adjudicators' tendencies to focus on minor discrepancies,
to rely on speculation, and to generally express a skepticism that they are
unable to ground in the record of each individual case. Indeed, the IJ
and BIA opinions under review in the Second Circuit suggest that many
of today's administrative adjudicators, just like those of the Chinese
exclusion period, see themselves as "confronting a mass of fraudulent
177. Id. at 82.
178. Id. at 91-92.
179. Id. at 92.
180. Id.
181. On the efforts to increase the professionalism and independence of today's Us,
see ALEINIKOFF, MARTIN & MOTOMURA, supra note 75, at 249-50; Sidney B. Rawitz,
From Wong Yang Sung to Black Robes, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 453, 457-69 (1988).
2006]
Catholic University Law Review
claims backed by perjured witnesses suborned by unscrupulous
attorneys.',1
82
While there are likely multiple causes of the current tension over
credibility findings, the "new asylum seeker" paradigm is probably an
important one.' 83 First, the "new asylum seekers" often rely on smugglers
and false documents, they chose their destination countries rather than
simply seeking asylum directly on the other side of their countries'
borders, and they are no longer viewed through the prism of cold war
geopolitics. All of this has the tendency to encourage skepticism.
Second, the "new asylum seekers" come in high volume, which seems to
far outpace the resources allocated to adjudicating their claims. This
means that the administrators not only see large numbers of very
repetitive claims, but they are also under huge pressure to adjudicate
these claims quickly, with little support. Third, the "new asylum seekers"
come from far away, making it hard for them, and even harder for the
government, to gather specific evidence on their claims. This means that
there is often very little solid evidence in the record on which to base
findings. There is almost never, for instance, the option of simply
choosing between the conflicting stories given by the witnesses called by
each party.
It is not that the administrators have no grounds to be skeptical. Many
of today's asylum seekers do present fraudulent claims' 4 (as, too, did
many of the people who sought to bypass the Chinese exclusion laws 100
years ago' 5). Nor is it that the courts are unaware of all this fraud. The
Second Circuit has not only seen a prominent New York immigration
lawyer plead guilty to submitting hundreds of fraudulent asylum
applications,'18 6 it has also seen the claim at issue in its well-known
187Abankwah decision turn out to be a fake.
182. Neuman, supra note 153, at 638-39 (describing the Chinese Exclusion period).
183. Another may simply be that accurately judging a witness' truthfulness is an
extremely difficult task, and people are bound to disagree over both the process and the
outcome. As the Second Circuit has remarked, "these cases, simply put, are hard." Li
Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2006).
184. See generally Ko-LIN CHIN, SMUGGLED CHINESE: CLANDESTINE IMMIGRATION
TO THE UNITED STATES (1999); PETER KWONG, FORBIDDEN WORKERS: ILLEGAL
CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND AMERICAN LABOR (1997).
185. See SALYER, supra note 151, at 44, 61-62.
186. See United States v. Porges, 80 F. App'x 130, 131 (2d Cir. 2003); Brief for the
United States of America at 5, Porges, 80 F. App'x 130 (2d Cir. 2003) (Nos. 02-1520(L),
02-1522, 02-1549).
187. For a fascinating account of the case (and the subsequent prosecution for perjury,
false statements, and passport fraud), see David A. Martin, Adelaide Abankwah, Fauziya
Kasinga, and the Dilemmas of Political Asylum, in IMMIGRATION STORIES (David A.
Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005).
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The tension arises, however, when "different institutional orientation
and practices ' '... are brought to bear on the "new asylum seekers"'
claims. Many of the administrators, already skeptical, confronted with
masses of similar cases, under intense pressures from both outside the
agency and within, and less bound by rules of evidence, seem to view
claims in the aggregate and base findings on generalized skepticism. The
courts, confronted with a smaller and more varied pool of cases, having
the benefits of greater resources and the independence that comes with
life tenure, and grounded in the notion of individualized justice, insist
instead that findings be tied to the specific evidence in each applicant's
record.
A striking example of this can be gleaned from the Second Circuit's
opinion in Guo-Le Huang v. Gonzales."9 In that case, a Chinese man
had claimed asylum based on allegations that government officials in his
village had forcibly aborted his wife's pregnancy, and threatened him and
his wife with sterilization after he had confronted the officials about their
human rights abuses.' 90 The U found him not to be credible based,
according to his oral ruling, on four reasons: first, Guo-Le Huang had
introduced a document, purportedly issued by the village officials,
confirming that his wife had been forced to have an abortion.' 9' The U
concluded that this document was "clearly . . . fraudulent" because he
saw no reason why the village officials would admit to carrying out
persecution that the Chinese national government regularly denies, and
because Guo-Le Huang could not "give any possible reason why such a
document would be needed by anybody in China.', 9 2 Second, the IJ did
not believe Guo-Le Huang's account of his confrontation with the village
officials because, "[a]n uneducated villager, such as [Huang], really
would not be making human rights arguments.' ' 93 Third, the IJ faulted
Guo-Le Huang for failing to offer medical documents to explain why his
wife had not been sterilized immediately after her abortion.'14 Finally,
the IJ faulted Guo-Le Huang for having given up his first child for
adoption because she was a girl, explaining that this was "a very sexist
act," and that "in America, parents generally believe in sacrificing for
their children."' 195
188. SALYER, supra note 151, at 82 (discussing the Chinese exclusion period).
189. 453 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2006).
190. Id. at 144.
191. Id. at 145.
192. Id. at 145-46 (quoting IJ's oral decision) (internal quotations omitted).
193. Id. at 145 (quoting U' oral decision) (internal quotations omitted).
194. Id.
195. Id. (quoting IJ's oral decision) (internal quotations omitted).
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The Second Circuit rejected each of these reasons (as well as three
additional reasons given by the BIA). 96 The court found the first reason
problematic because, contrary to the IJ's characterization of the record,
Guo-Le Huang had, in fact, offered a reason for why the abortion
document was needed. 9 7  The court found the IJ's second reason
speculative, his third reason unsupported by the record, and his last
reason simply unrelated to credibility.'" The last reason, however,
provided a hint as to the real reasons behind the J's decision, which
became much clearer from the hearing transcripts themselves.
The transcripts revealed that the IJ had expressed skepticism about
Guo-Le Huang's truthfulness from the very start, before the merits of his
claim were even discussed.2 ° At an initial hearing, the IJ had found it
"ridiculous" that Guo-Le Huang, who lacked work authorization,
claimed to be complying with the law and not working.20' The IJ had
remarked that "[e]verybody else has no papers and they are working in
restaurants all over the country., 2 2 At the second hearing, the IJ had
found it hard to believe that Guo-Le Huang was living in a Hispanic
neighborhood on 105th Street in New York City, remarking that "most
of the people are living in Chinatown."203 Finally, at the merits hearing
itself, the IJ had "launched into a diatribe against Chinese immigrants
lying on the witness stand, spanning 12 pages of the transcript.
20 4
Among other things, the IJ had complained that "Chinese applicants
would say one thing to each other 'in a restaurant in Chinatown,' but
when they sat in the 'magic chair' in the witness box, they would say that
they were persecuted under the family planning policy. 205 The IJ had
also berated Guo-Le Huang for giving up his daughter for adoption,
telling him that his "culture is prejudiceld] against females."2 6
This may be an unusual case because the IJ's remarks indicate such
blatant skepticism, much of which seems to have been based solely on
the fact that Guo-Le Huang was a Chinese asylum-seeker. Indeed, the
Second Circuit, while assuming that this was an atypical departure from
196. Id. at 146-47.
197. Id. at 146.
198. Id. at 146-47.
199. Id. at 147 (noting that the U's speculation "appears to have been influenced by his
evidence bias against Huang").
200. Id. at 148-50 (discussing and quoting the hearing transcript).
201. Id. at 148 (quoting the hearing transcript) (internal quotations omitted).
202. Id. at 149 (quoting hearing transcript) (internal quotations omitted).
203. Id. (quoting hearing transcript) (internal quotations omitted).
204. Id.
205. Id. (quoting hearing transcript).
206. Id. (quoting hearing transcript) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in
original).
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this particular IJ's normal conduct, was so troubled by the apparent bias
here that it actually directed the agency to assign the case to a different
IJ in the event that further consideration was needed on remand.2 7 At
the same time, however, this generalized skepticism and tendency to
view asylum claims in the aggregate is clear in other cases as well, even if
more subtly expressed.
An example that may seem less shocking is the tendency of many IJs
to focus on generalized State Department reports of document fraud in
China when judging the credibility of Chinese asylum applicants. To
the extent that these reports are accurate, it would not be illogical to
conclude that any given group of Chinese asylum seekers may be
carrying a higher than average proportion of fraudulent documents.
Faced with the pressure of adjudicating thousands of Chinese asylum
claims, there is clearly a temptation to translate the assumed proportion
of fraudulent documents within the group as a whole into a probability
that each individual applicant's documents are fraudulent. But while this
might be a statistically sound way to achieve a measure of accuracy in the
aggregate, it clashes with the notion of individualized justice. As the
Second Circuit held in Rui Ying Lin v. Gonzales,209 "it is not reasonable
to conclude ... that every document from China is presumptively a
forgery" based solely on the fraud reports. Instead, an adjudicator
must evaluate the documentary evidence in each case on its own
211
merits.
207. Id. at 151.
208. See, e.g., Xiu Ling Zhang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 150, 157 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting
that the IJ may have relied on a 1998 State Department Report's finding that
documentation from certain parts of China "is subject to widespread fabrication and
fraud") (internal quotations omitted); Xing Chan Yang v. Ashcroft, 104 F. App'x 254, 257
(3d Cir. 2004) (unpublished decision) (noting I's reliance on a State Department report to
find that "the Court must be on guard . . . with regard to any and all documentation
coming from China, especially Fujian province which apparently is replete with fraud")
(omission in original); Jiamu Wang v. INS, 352 F.3d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting I's
reliance on a 1995 State Department report entitled China-Country Conditions and
Comments on Asylum Applications to find that documentation from China is "marked by
widespread fabrication and fraud") (internal quotations omitted); see also IRENA
OMELANIUK, Coop. EFFORTS TO MANAGE EMIGRATION, BEST PRACTICES TO
MANAGE MIGRATION: CHINA (2004), available at http://migration.ucdavis.edu/
ceme/more.php?id=1490 _6 0 (discussing document fraud in China).
209. 445 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2006).
210. Id. at 134.
211. See id. at 134-35. The Ninth Circuit expressed this same point in a 1950s Chinese
citizenship case, in which it overturned a district court's adverse credibility finding because
the finding was predicated on the similarity between the applicant's claim and other
Chinese citizenship claims that the trial judge had adjudicated. Mar Gong v. Brownell,
209 F.2d 448, 450-53 (9th Cir. 1954). The Ninth Circuit held that the trial court "should
not have given weight to its experiences, unfortunate as they may have been, in other
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Even in cases in which generalized skepticism or aggregate approaches
to credibility are not explicitly stated, these tendencies often appear to be
lurking in the background. For instance, the Second Circuit has
frequently criticized 1Js for basing adverse credibility findings on minor
discrepancies in applicants' evidence"' or on speculation that is not tied
to the record.213 Although some of these errors may simply reflect close
judgment calls over which people are bound to disagree,"' the propensity
to make adverse credibility findings with little support also suggests that
the same underlying skepticism or aggregate approach explicitly stated in
Guo-Le Huang and Rui Ying Lin may be the unstated driving force
behind many of these decisions.
To be sure, one gets a skewed picture of the 1Js and BIA by looking
solely at cases that have been challenged in the federal courts,"' and this
cases, in arriving at its findings with respect to this appellant." Id. at 453. Instead, "[e]ach
case should be allowed to stand upon its own bottom." Id.
212. See, e.g., Pavlova v. INS, 441 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that an
applicant's "minor fault" in the medical terminology used to describe the condition of her
ovaries was, "at most, the sort of de minimis, nonmaterial inconsistency that we have often
stated may not form the basis for an adverse credibility determination"); Chung Sai Zheng
v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (holding that an applicant's
medically erroneous description of his vasectomy as involving an operation on his
"muscles," and a discrepancy on the applicant's child's birth certificate regarding the
location of the birth, were "patently insufficient to support an adverse credibility
finding"); Latifi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 103, 105 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that a
determination could not be supported by "insignificant and trivial" discrepancies);
Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 308-09 (2d Cir. 2003).
213. See, e.g., Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2006);
Pavlova, 441 F.3d at 88; Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir.
2006); Secaida-Rosales, 331 F.3d at 309-10.
214. See Ming Xia Chen v. BIA, 435 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that "it is
inevitable that some findings of lack of credibility will be deemed supportable by one
panel that would not pass muster in the view of another panel").
215. One reason for this skewed picture is that the government cannot seek judicial
review of BIA decisions. Consequently, the courts do not see the thousands of cases in
which asylum applicants are found credible and granted relief. In fiscal year 2005, for
example, the immigration courts nationwide granted 11,737 asylum claims, and denied
19,166. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2005
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK K2 (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/
fy05syb.pdf. Leaving aside claims that were withdrawn, abandoned, or otherwise disposed
of, this translates into a grant rate of 38%. For the New York immigration court, which is
the source of most of the asylum decisions under review in the Second Circuit, the grant
rate was 62%, or 2,760 grants and 3,285 denials. Id. at K6 tbl.8. In addition, these
numbers do not take into account all of the asylum claims granted at the asylum officer
level before applicants are even placed in expulsion proceedings. See KELLY JEFFERYS,
U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: REFUGEES AND ASYLEES:
2005, at 5 tbl.9 (2006), available at http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/sharedlstatisticsl
publications/RefugeeAsylee 5.pdf (reporting 13,520 grants in fiscal year 2005).
The New York immigration court's 62% grant rate may well suggest that the tension
visible in Second Circuit published opinions is based only on aberrational errors. On the
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Article does not attempt to quantify the extent to which generalized
skepticism exists among the administrative adjudicators or the rate at
which it manifests itself in their decisions. However, a qualitative
analysis of the Second Circuit's opinions suggests that the flaws that do
exist stem from a tendency of many administrative adjudicators to be
swayed by generalized skepticism over the "new asylum seekers," and to
view their claims in the aggregate instead of tying findings to the
evidence presented in each individual case. Now that the increased
litigation has immersed the court in credibility issues, this administrative
tendency is clashing with the judiciary's case-by-case, record-oriented
approach to individualized justice.
CONCLUSIONS
The recent increase in immigration litigation has presented major
challenges for the Second Circuit. It has significantly transformed the
court's docket, and led to procedural changes designed to help the court
keep up with all the extra work. It has also brought the court face-to-
face with the "new asylum seeker," leading to an explosion of
precedential opinions addressing issues of credibility. These opinions
appear to reflect a tension between, on the one hand, the tendency of
many administrative adjudicators to view cases in the aggregate and rely
on generalized skepticism, and on the other hand, the court's focus on
the evidence in each individual record. The sheer volume of these cases
and the immersion in factual disputes have been burdensome, to say the
least. The court's response, however, has been "to do what judges do
best--to decide one case at a time.,
216
other hand, 62% may be a low grant rate when one considers that this is a class of cases in
which the government rarely introduces any evidence directly bearing on the events in
dispute, relying instead mostly on the evidence introduced by the applicants themselves.
An added complication is that behind the overall immigration court grant rates, there is
wide variation between the grant rates of individual Js. See Transactional Records
Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), Immigration Judge Reports -- Asylum, at
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judgereports/.
216. Li Hua Lin, 453 F.3d at 112.
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